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'The Assistance of Science and Capital": 
The Role of Technology in Establishing B.C.'s 
Hard Rock Mining Industry, 1876-1906* 
JEREMY MOUAT 
RESUME 
Cet article analyse le rôle des sciences 
et des technologies appliquées à 
l'industrie minière en Colombie-
Britannique, au cours de la période 
de transition qui va du milieu du 
19e siècle jusqu'à l'émergence, en 
1906, de Cominco, complexe 
industriel intégré de la mine aux 
fonderies, typique des grandes com-
pagnies minières du 20e siècle. Bien 
que maints observateurs de l'épo-
que étaient persuadés que le 
développement scientifique et tech-
nologique constituait un facteur de 
progrès, cette étude suggère que le 
passage des méthodes traditionnel-
les aux techniques "modernes" a été 
plus difficile que prévu et que les 
résultats obtenus sont plutôt ambiv-
alents. 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the role of 
technology and applied science in 
British Columbia's hard rock min-
ing industry. It focuses on a transi-
tional period, from the decline 
following the gold rushes of the 
mid century through to the emer-
gence in 1906 of Cominco, a verti-
cally-integrated mining and 
smelting complex typical of the 
large mining companies of the 
twentieth century. Although many 
contemporary observers held a 
naive faith in the possibilities of sci-
ence and technology, the article 
argues that the transition to "mod-
ern mining" was more difficult and 
more complex than they had antic-
ipated and its outcome a good deal 
more ambivalent. 
THE EXPORT of natural resources has been the central feature of the Western Canadian economy since settlement by Europe-ans in the mid nineteenth century (and much earlier in those 
parts touched by the fur trade). Dependent upon distant markets 
for the sale of its varied products of the forest, ocean, mine and 
prairie, the region was quickly incorporated into the expanding 
network of world trade. It was also a "region of recent settlement," 
one of those areas which John Fogarty argues "must be defined by 
the facts of their absorption of European migrants and capital and 
their involvement in the expanding international economy of the 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth century/'1 Without question, 
Western Canada participated in and relied upon "the unique 
growth of the nineteenth century economy and the interdepen-
dent set of linkages and transfers of resources which it evoked."2 
The resource industries of Western Canada developed in the 
context of this exchange or dialogue between the various partners 
in the emerging international economy. At first the methods of 
exploiting the region's natural resources reflected the prior experi-
ence of immigrants, people who had brought their own (often 
rudimentary) skills and techniques. The bounty of available 
resources - notably the alluvial gold deposits that sparked a series 
of rushes beginning in 1859 - returned windfall profits to some. 
However, by the early 1900s market pressures forced mining and 
other extractive industries to rely heavily on science and technol-
ogy in order to achieve economies of scale.3 The following pages 
examine this transition. The central focus is on the ways in which 
applied science and improved technology facilitated the profitable 
extraction of minerals in British Columbia. Contemporaries saw 
these as sure panaceas for the economic difficulties of the post-rush 
era, although typically there was little appreciation of the complex-
ities involved in the wholesale transfer of new equipment or the 
implementation of new processes. This point is developed in the 
following discussion of the abortive efforts to establish lode mining 
in the Cariboo in the 1870s and the 1880s; the contribution of 
both railways and smelters to the mining industry of the 1880s and 
1890s; and finally, the rise of Rossland/Trail, the centre of the 
province's mining industry by the turn of the century and birth-
place of the mining and smelting conglomerate, Cominco. 
* * * 
By the middle years of the nineteenth century, Europeans had 
some knowledge of the mineral wealth of British Columbia. Van-
couver Island's coal resources and the placer gold deposits of the 
mainland promised that the region would prosper in the coming 
decades. In both cases, however, mining was beset by considerable 
initial difficulties. Efforts by the Hudson's Bay Company to develop 
a coal mine at Fort Rupert after 1848 proved fruitless and the 
company's second attempt at mining on Vancouver Island, at 
Nanaimo, was only marginally successful. (However, the Nanaimo 
mine did return handsome profits after its sale to private interests 
in 1862.4) The Fraser River gold rush was also marked by initial 
difficulties. Bonanza discoveries typical of other nineteenth cen-
tury gold excitements did not occur until two years after the first 
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Figure 1 
B.C. Placer Gold Production 1859-1893 
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stampede and the departure of many disgruntled miners.5 
Although undeniably a rich one, the Cariboo gold field centred 
around Barkerville did not lead to extensive and long-lasting min-
ing operations. After the first flush of activity - and the completion 
of the Cariboo Road, to encourage economic linkages with the 
coastal population centres - gold revenues declined sharply. Figure 
1 ("B.C. Placer Gold Production 1859-1893") suggests the trend by 
the 1880s, with the exhaustion of the richest deposits.6 Production 
was inevitably falling; revival could only come with the adoption 
of new and more efficient methods of mining. 
Conscious of the dwindling returns from placer mining, the 
Annual Reports of British Columbia's Minister of Mines frequently 
advocated moving beyond working such alluvial deposits (the 
water-borne gold found along creeks or ancient water-courses) to 
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mining gold in situ,, in the gold-bearing guartz found around 
Barkerville. However, hard rock or lode mining was very different 
from placer mining. After all, placer gold was pure gold - no 
secondary treatment was required once it had been found - and its 
recovery called for relatively simple techniques, utilising gravity 
and water. This accounted for the appeal of placer mining, as a 
1907 booklet on B.C.'s mines argued: 
the placer is the "poor man's mine"; he needs little or no capital to work 
it; its product is cash, to all intents and purposes, and he is his own mas-
ter - all attractions too great for the sturdy independence of the prospec-
tor to allow him to think of searching for lode mines, which, when 
found, require so much capital to work them as to leave but very small 
interest in the property with the original owner.7 
As the passage hints, hard rock mining could only be carried out 
successfully with considerable capital outlay and such concomi-
tants as sophisticated geological knowledge, engineering expertise, 
and a skilled workforce. Applied science was a critical ingredient in 
this package, as residents of the Cariboo were to discover. 
The complexities of hard rock mining were not readily compre-
hended by the enthusiastic boosters of the Cariboo's quartz mines, 
people anxious only to reverse the slump in gold revenues. The 
region's miners had acquired the skills of shaft sinking and tunnel-
ling by the 1870s, in order to follow placer deposits underground 
along ancient riverbeds, but more was involved in lode mining 
than simply locating a quartz deposit and then bringing the ore to 
the surface. This became clear when Barkerville experienced a 
"quartz excitement" in the late 1870s, a flurry of feverish activity 
which ended in total failure. In 1876 a company was formed to 
work the quartz deposits of the Cariboo; it sent ore samples to San 
Francisco for assay and readied machinery for "a new era in the 
mining annals of this Province."8 Residents of the area lobbied the 
provincial government in the spring of 1877 for the appointment 
of a mining engineer, arguing that "the assistance of science and 
capital" was necessary to develop quartz mining. The government 
agreed to the request and enlisted the help of the British Consul in 
California to hire a Cornishman ("a thoroughly practical quartz 
miner") who arrived in Barkerville in July 1877.9 The Cariboo's 
Government Agent for 1877 predicted that "an era of prosperity is 
about to dawn on Cariboo, surpassing the palmy days of 1863." In 
the three months since the arrival of the new mining engineer, he 
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reported, prospectors staked thirty-six quartz claims. Another 
eighty-two claims were staked in the last two months of the year.10 
Despite this enthusiasm and effort, the new age did not dawn. 
More restrained reports from the Cariboo in 1878 and 1879 regret-
fully acknowledged that hard rock mining had yet to be established 
on a paying basis, despite the expenditure of considerable amounts 
of money. (The British Columbia Milling and Mining Company, 
for example, invested some $100,000 before suspending opera-
tions.) Although no one could question the existence of gold-bear-
ing quartz, nor the significant assay values that the ore carried, the 
trick was to learn how to treat the quartz successfully and recover a 
significant percentage of the gold within it.11 
By the mid 1880s Cariboo's quartz was once more attracting 
interest. In 1886 a typical passage in the Annual Report of the 
Minister of Mines foresaw a new era: 
the most sanguine hopes are entertained with regard to the profitable 
working of gold quartz. In fact, information from every source irresist-
ibly leads to the conclusion that the era of quartz mining is at hand.12 
Similar optimism had been expressed the year before, when the 
Geological Survey of Canada had sent a team to Barkerville to map 
the area. At the same time, representatives of the provincial gov-
ernment solicited the opinion of a number of people on the pros-
pects for quartz mining in the Cariboo. "Mr Koch, mining expert" 
was commissioned to write a report on the gold quartz deposits; 
Wm. Craib, like Koch, an expert from California, submitted a letter 
in response to a series of thorny questions, such as "the best 
method to introduce our quartz interests to capitalists in order that 
they might be induced to advance the means to prospect and open 
up the same/'13 During the following year Barkerville's government 
assay office was re-opened by a "Mr. E. A. Martin ... a man who has 
had much experience with the treatment of refractory ores, by the 
latest known methods, [who] will be a valuable acquisition in the 
development of our Quartz Mining Interests."14 Martin extended 
the provincial government's role in Barkerville, supervising the 
erection of an extensive "Government Reduction Works" in 1888. 
This was an elaborate plant (including a furnace for roasting the 
ore, as well as a stamp mill for reducing it, a concentrator, a steam 
engine, and a chlorinating plant), although it appears to have 
operated for only a short time before being destroyed by fire in the 
winter of 1889-90.15 Efforts to treat Cariboo ore continued: in 1890, 
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Figure 2 
Production of B.C.'s Lode Mines 1887-1906 
Annual Value (Current Dollars) 
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samples were sent to Scotland to be treated by the newly-discov-
ered cyanide process; two years later the Scottish company sent a 
representative to Barkerville to promote the process.16 
Although none of these initiatives ended in success, they 
indicate the energy (and perhaps, the misplaced optimism) of 
those within the mining industry. Revival was always just 
around the corner, and would come with more generous govern-
ment help, greater investment, and/or more sophisticated tech-
nology. Few doubted that all that was needed to treat the 
refractory ore of Barkerville was the application of appropriate 
technology, such as that in use in Nevada and California, places 
where the transition from placer to quartz mining had already 
taken place. As the Cariboo's gold commissioner confidently 
explained, "science has demonstrated the fact that the infinites-
imally fine gold locked up in sulphuret ore can be nearly all 
extracted and saved without the unsatisfactory and expensive 
aid of arastra wheels and quicksilver."17 Despite such optimism, 
the introduction of the latest processes to treat gold ore (such as 
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chlorination and cyanidation) did not bring the anticipated suc-
cess. The emergence of the lode mining industry after 1893 was not 
due to the exploitation of the Barkerville deposits but a result of 
developments elsewhere. The most significant factor was the estab-
lishment of a new transportation system, a network which did not 
include the Cariboo. Hard rock mining's requirements for sub-
stantial equipment, as well as the need to ship ore to smelters for 
treatment, meant that access to reliable and inexpensive trans-
portation was critical if the industry was to prosper. As figure 2 
("Production of B.C.'s Lode Mines 1887-1906") indicates, by the 
early years of this century the industry was well-established.18 
The bulk of this mineral production came from southern British 
Columbia. Europeans had identified minerals in this area of the 
province as early as the 1840s. (Chief Factor John McLoughlin of 
the Hudson's Bay Company, for example, sent samples of lead 
deposits from around Kootenay Lake to England in 1844, and 
fifteen years later H. Bauerman reported the existence of rich 
galena in the same locality.19) Despite this knowledge, geographical 
barriers meant that the formal staking of such mineral wealth did 
not take place until 1882. Six years later George Mercer Dawson, 
the well-known Canadian geologist, reflected on the reasons why 
"development of metalliferous mining in its more permanent 
forms has been slow," despite British Columbia's early career as 
gold producer. "[0]ne of the chief drawbacks [he concluded] has 
always been the want of proper means of transport for heavy 
machinery and for ores."20 Substantial development of the mineral 
resources of the Kootenays became possible only after the construc-
tion of the transcontinental railways in the 1880s. 
The first of these transcontinentals, the Northern Pacific Rail-
way, started running in 1883, passing south of the border from 
Minnesota to Portland, Oregon, via Sandpoint in Idaho, and Spo-
kane, Washington.21 In 1885 the Canadian Pacific Railway [CPR] 
was completed, connecting Montreal to Port Moody via Golden 
and Revelstoke. In addition to the two railways, by the late 1880s 
steamboats operated on a regular basis on the three north-south 
water routes of the Kootenays (the Purcell, Selkirk and Rocky 
Mountain Trenches), providing limited connections with both the 
CPR and the Northern Pacific. The improved transportation net-
work encouraged prospectors to fan out across the Interior, and 
most of the famous Kootenay mines were first staked during the 
1880s and early 1890s. Ironically, the Canadian Pacific Railway was 
ultimately to control much of the province's mining industry, but 
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during the closing decades of the nineteenth century the most 
pressing concern was how to establish and then extend the rail 
network, rather than speculation on its possible consequences.22 
Almost as soon as the railway reached the Pacific coast a second 
issue arose, the need for local smelters to treat the province's ore. 
People argued that smelters were needed so that the mining indus-
try would provide the greatest possible benefit to the regional 
economy, and this demand quickly became part of the public 
discourse on mining.23 The provincial government responded to 
this pressure in the spring of 1886, passing "An Act to encourage 
the erection of Smelting Works." A front page article in the Victoria 
Daily Times welcomed this gesture, claiming that the act 
will meet with the approval of every man in the province.... We have the 
mines and they ought to be developed.... The successful operation of one 
quartz mill would be worth more than two or three large woollen mills 
to the province.24 
The legislature passed a related bill in 1887 ("An Act to aid the 
Development of Quartz Mines"); in a similar vein Vancouver's 
ratepayers approved a bylaw in the autumn of that year, giving 
both direct financial assistance as well as a ten year tax holiday to 
any business constructing a smelter within city limits. Although a 
smelter was subsequently built in Vancouver, operating briefly in 
the spring of 1889, the venture ended disastrously.25 This failure 
does not seem to have dampened the enthusiasm of local interests 
for smelters: in 1893, at least some business people were welcoming 
a proposal to build a steel smelter in Vancouver.26 In 1896, another 
smelter proposal was creating headlines ("It Is Vancouver: The 
Future Site of an Immense Busy Smelter"), encouraging journalists 
to conclude that this was "bound to become one of the greatest 
smelting works on the whole globe."27 
By this time, even the federal government had entered the field, 
bringing in legislation in the summer of 1895 to encourage the 
construction of smelters in the province. Defending this initiative, 
George Foster (Minister of Finance in Mackenzie Bowell's Conser-
vative ministry) reiterated the common rationale for smelters: 
The object the Government have in view is to give an impetus to the 
mining and smelting industry.... It is believed that a very great benefit 
will result. A mining population is particularly a consuming population. 
It makes nothing for its own wear, and for its own food, but it calls 
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lavishly and constantly for the products of the manufacturer, and more 
especially for the products of the agriculturist. ... The object is to give a 
stimulus to the development [of a smelting industry in Canada] at once, 
to get capital to go in and set up establishments there, and commence 
operations, so as to give the benefits that are derived from a large industry.28 
Despite a number of false starts, smelters were soon being built 
throughout the province's interior, as well as several on the coast.29 
The most successful of these was built in 1896 at Trail, to treat the 
copper gold ores from nearby Rossland. 
Rossland was the province's premier hard rock mining commu-
nity in the late nineteenth century - "as well known in London as 
Johannesburg"30 - and its career highlights the various issues raised 
thus far. Here the new age of lode mining began, that transition so 
eagerly anticipated by the residents of the Cariboo. The critical 
preconditions for success, railways and smelters, were quickly in 
place, once the mines had proved their value. No simple equation 
explains Rossland's growth, however; railways plus smelters plus 
ore deposits did not automatically result in an established lode 
mining industry. 
Several contemporaries noted that Rossland's rise to prominence 
was partly the result of generally depressed mining conditions 
elsewhere. As a consequence the town and its mines attracted the 
attention of wealthy developers seeking new outlets for their 
energy and capital. For example, in his 1895 pamphlet on the 
Kootenay mines Charles St. Barbe explained how "mining matters 
in the Western States and throughout British Columbia being flat[,] 
the wave of public attention rolled towards Trail Creek."31 In early 
1896, in an article in a Toronto newspaper, Harold Kingsmill 
offered a more detailed explanation of what he called "The 
Awakening": 
The closing of the Indian mints to the coinage of silver, the repeal of the 
silver purchasing clause of the Sherman act by the United States Con-
gress, and the consequent slump in the price of the white metal, had ren-
dered silver mining so unprofitable and hazardous an investment that it 
actually compelled money usually used in this industry to seek the only 
other alternative - gold mining for ores, from which it could be profit-
ably extracted, no matter how small the margin. These were the indirect 
causes of Trail Creek's present prosperity and fame. Patsy Clark bonding 
and making a mine of the War Eagle claim is the direct cause.32 
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F. Augustus Heinze, a young copper magnate from Butte, Mon-
tana, was among those turning their attention to Rossland. In the 
summer of 1895 he sent two men up to Rossland to check on the 
area's prospects. Impressed by the men's account, he signed a deal 
in the autumn with the owners of the LeRoi mine, guaranteeing to 
supply him with 5,000 tons of ore. With an ore contract in hand 
(an agreement later described as "without a doubt the greatest and 
most important event of the year"33), Heinze quickly built a smelter 
at Trail Landing, on a terrace above the Columbia River. Trail's first 
smelter was blown in on 1 February 1896. To facilitate the supply of 
ore from Rossland to his smelter, Heinze built a narrow gauge 
railway, which was running by June. For his smelter to function at 
capacity, Heinze had to treat virtually the entire output of the 
Rossland mines. Although no other smelters were built in the 
vicinity, Heinze's monopoly of Rossland ore soon came to an end. 
In December 1896, Daniel Corbin completed his Columbia and 
Red Mountain Railway, which ran from Rossland to Northport, 
Washington, where it linked up with his other railway, the Spokane 
Falls and Northern. Thus the new railway provided Rossland with a 
direct connection to the two American transcontinentals running 
through Spokane, the Northern Pacific and (from 1892) the Great 
Northern.34 As a Spokane newspaper proclaimed, 'The construc-
tion of the Red Mountain railroad ... has made Spokane the virtual 
headquarters of Rossland's mining men, and the acknowledged 
trade center of the entire Trail Creek region."35 This was particularly 
bad news for Heinze: soon Rossland ore was among the freight 
going south on the Columbia and Red Mountain Railway, calling 
into question the viability of his smelter at Trail. 
The LeRoi was Rossland's major producing mine and its ore had 
to go to Heinze's smelter if it was to function economically. The 
Spokane businessmen who owned the LeRoi, however, decided to 
utilise Corbin's railway to ship their ore across the border. They 
built their own smelter in Northport, Washington during 1897, 
which was finished and blown in on 1 January 1898.36 Heinze 
attempted to rally public opinion in British Columbia around him 
and lobbied hard in Victoria and Ottawa for further railway grants 
and a duty on exported ore, hoping somehow to regain his monop-
oly of Rossland ore. However, when he received word that the 
manager of his Butte properties had gone over to his competitors, 
he decided to give up the struggle. On 11 February 1898 he sold his 
smelter and railway to the Canadian Pacific Railway and returned 
to Butte.37 
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The CPR's interest in the Kootenay mining region had begun 
almost as soon as regular transcontinental traffic was under way. In 
1889, for example, company shareholders were notified that the 
CPR had control of the Columbia and Kootenay Railway.38 
Throughout the 1890s the railway continued to improve and 
expand its Kootenay connections. Major acquisitions came in the 
period 1896 - 1898, beginning with the purchase of the Columbia 
and Kootenay Steam Navigation Company, the major group of 
river boats providing the vital connections between various rail 
lines of the area. Then came the construction of a railway into the 
Kootenays from Alberta through the Crow's Nest Pass route. And in 
early 1898, the company bought Heinze's railway, the Columbia 
and Western, as well as his smelter at Trail. CPR shareholders were 
told that all this would stimulate further mining development in 
southern British Columbia "and is certain to add largely to the 
earnings of the Company."39 If anything threatened this antici-
pated prosperity, it was competition from the rail lines south of the 
border. The CPR soon learned that Corbin too had sold his railway 
into Rossland. By 1 July 1898, J. J. Hill's Great Northern Railway 
controlled the line which connected Rossland's mines to the 
smelter in Northport, Washington as well as linking the city to the 
American transcontinentals which ran through Spokane.40 Ore 
shipments offered railways regular and lucrative business, and 
intense competition began between Hill's Great Northern group 
and the CPR,41 
Railway competition in southeastern British Columbia was more 
wide-ranging than simply rivalry for ore traffic or supplying the 
province's smelters with coal and coke. At stake was which rail 
network would assume the dominant position in the Canadian 
west, especially in the area between the CPJR'S main line and the 
U.S. border. Both the Great Northern and the CPR went to consid-
erable efforts to ensure victory. The construction of two separate 
and distinct transportation systems within the Kootenays was one 
consequence of this battle.42 Another was the CPJR's commitment 
to vertical integration: it decided to re-furbish and extend Heinze's 
smelter. The company re-organized the Trail plant as the Canadian 
Smelting Works, and placed it in the hands of an energetic and 
ambitious American, W. H. Aldridge. 
Like Kootenay railways, the region's smelters needed consider-
able quantities of ore to achieve profitable operations. The LeRoi's 
Northport smelter was a serious threat to the Canadian Smelting 
Works, since it siphoned off a substantial percentage of Rossland's 
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production. Aldridge's response was to diversify the Trail smelter. 
After he took over the works on 1 March 1898, it closed for 
improvements and expansion. The changes that Aldridge initiated 
allowed the smelter to treat the silver lead ores of the Slocan and 
East Kootenay, in addition to Rossland's copper gold ores. Despite 
the capital outlay required to construct the lead furnaces and roast-
ers, the capacity to treat silver lead ores provided the smelter's 
owners with a greater range of potential customers. The CPR had 
several connections between Trail and the Slocan mines, while the 
CPR's Crow's Nest Pass railway and its Kootenay Lake steamers 
between them could bring the Moyie area's silver lead ore to Trail.43 
Despite these advantages, however, the new smelter was not an 
immediate success. 
In 1901, Aldridge faced two difficulties. A miners' strike brought 
a prolonged shutdown of his main Rossland producers, while a 
steep drop in the price of lead closed a number of the province's 
silver lead mines.44 Sir Thomas Shaughnessy, CPR president, called 
him to Montreal to discuss the problems and then outlined the 
company's difficulties in a long and candid letter to Sir Richard 
Cartwright, the federal Minister of Trade and Commerce. 
Shaughnessy admitted to Cartwright that 
With the large investment that we have made in railways to serve these 
mining districts, amounting to about $15,000,000, in the last four years, 
we are, of course, very much disturbed by the conditions that prevail [in 
British Columbia]. Practically, all of the ore now produced in the Ross-
land camp goes to the Northport Smelter, because the Le Roi and Josie 
Mines have their own smelter at that point. We ... made them a proposi-
tion to do the work at Trail at much lower figures. They declined, 
because, no doubt, the abandonment of their Northport smelter might 
injuriously affect some of their stock operations in London. 
We have left no stone unturned to encourage the opening and opera-
tion of mines, because, of course, we must depend upon them for the 
support of our railway lines in the mining districts.45 
Shaughnessy was irritated that so many B.C. mining companies 
publicly blamed railway and smelting charges for their financial 
problems which, as he pointed out to Cartwright, stemmed from 
low metal prices and high capitalization. 
While Shaughnessy resented such attacks on the CPR, the com-
pany and Kootenay mine owners plainly shared an over-riding 
concern in the health of the province's mining industry. Thus, 
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when a serious and unexpected threat arose in 1901, the two 
responded in unison. The American smelter conglomerate, Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Company [Asarco], was establishing 
monopoly control over the ore treatment industry in the United 
States.46 Asarco's success was such that by 1901 Canadian ores were 
no longer in demand south of the border. With the lucrative U.S. 
lead market in the hands of Asarco, B.C.'s silver lead mines had 
nowhere to ship their ores for treatment. The province's mine 
owners responded by initiating "a very active agitation for Govern-
ment assistance in the development of lead mining and smelt-
ing."47 During the spring of 1901, meetings were held throughout 
the Kootenays, often under the auspices of local Boards of Trade. As 
a consequence, "on April 15 a large deputation from the Kootenay 
district, generally, waited upon the members of the Government at 
Ottawa with the object of securing a bounty towards establishing 
the lead refining industry in Canada."48 Within six weeks the 
government responded to the pressure by introducing the called-
for lead bounty.49 
The CPR had earlier contemplated selling the smelter, but with 
the lead bounty now in place the company apparently renewed its 
commitment to Trail's expansion.50 A lead refinery was added to 
the Trail complex in 1902, utilising the new "Betts process" of 
electrolytic refining. This, the first ever commercial application of 
the new technology, proved to be a resounding success.51 The 
capacity of the original refinery was a modest eight tons a day but 
by 1904 this had doubled and in 1906 had reached 70 tons a day.52 
The Huntington-Heberlein roasting process, a recent advance in 
lead smelting, was also incorporated into the Trail plant in 1906. 
This was an important innovation for the plant's lead smelting, 
since it not only "resulted in a great reduction in smelting costs"53 
but also allowed the plant to operate much more efficiently with 
the locally available silver lead ores. As an earlier researcher has 
pointed out, the process provided significant advantages, "advan-
tages [which] were particularly important in areas where the lead 
industry depended on only a few mines producing the same type of 
ore, and where mix-smelting was unprofitable."54 Mix smelting 
involved blending a wide range of ores in order to maintain self-
fluxing or neutral charges for the furnaces; such a process was well 
suited to the American "valley smelters" of Colorado and Montana, 
since they could tap a diverse group of mines (and ores). The 
Huntington-Heberlein process freed the Trail smelter from its com-
petitive disadvantage as a mix smelter, allowing it to develop a 
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Figure 3 
Rossland Ore Production 1894-1921 
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custom process closely tailored to the East Kootenay ores.55 Under 
Aldridge's management, and with the active encouragement of 
both the federal government and senior CPR management, the 
Trail smelter adopted the latest technological advances and diversi-
fied its capacity, no longer a somewhat primitive copper smelter 
almost totally reliant on the Rossland ores but a modern plant able 
to treat virtually all the ores then mined in south-eastern British 
Columbia. 
The construction of the lead refinery and the adoption of the 
Huntington-Heberlein process established the Trail smelter as one 
of the most advanced on the continent; "probably the largest and 
most complete of its kind in America," pronounced R. W. Brock, 
the director of the Geological Survey of Canada.56 When the Cana-
dian Mining Institute organised an international "excursion to the 
mineral districts of Canada" in the late summer of 1908, the visit-
ing experts were much impressed by the Trail smelter and indeed 
with the Kootenay region generally. Describing the experience 
later, a member of the British contingent confessed that "the 
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visitors, who had been referred to by the local press in such flatter-
ing terms as 'eminent experts/ 'big fellows/ and the 'top notchers' 
of their profession, were all very ready to admit they had learnt a 
great deal from their genial professional Canadian brethren."57 
These overseas mining men were particularly struck by "the cour-
age exhibited in attacking low grade ores, and the technical and 
administrative skill which have established sound industrial con-
cerns upon low grade ore bodies."58 For Rossland managers, this 
was a case of necessity being the mother of invention. 
New technology was brought to Rossland in order to meet a 
growing crisis. This predicament had its roots in a speculative 
frenzy during 1896-97, when literally hundreds of mining compa-
nies were floated.59 As the boom in company formation and flota-
tion died away and the Klondike gold rush diverted attention from 
Rossland, the leading mines of Rossland - all American owned -
began to sell out to British and Canadian syndicates. In late 1897, 
for example, the War Eagle was sold to the Gooderham-Blackstock 
liquor interests of Toronto; in late 1898, they added the Centre Star 
to their group. The London-based British America Corporation was 
the other purchaser of leading Rossland properties. Throughout 
1898 it bought up claims, culminating in December with the pur-
chase of the LeRoi.60 Ironically, while the "repatriation" of the 
mines to British and Canadian interests was frequently applauded, 
its impact was detrimental. Regardless of the nationality of either 
vendor or purchaser, the mines were changing hands at ludicrously 
inflated prices and the only way that such over-valued properties 
could operate successfully would be by making drastic efforts to 
reduce costs. 
By this time Rossland's mines were places of considerable sophis-
tication, already having gone through "the transition period from 
the slow, old-fashioned method of hand-drilling, manual windlass 
work, and mule-packing, to compressed air-drills, concentrators, 
steam hoists and elevated rope tramways."61 The LeRoi is a good 
example: at the end of 1898 its plant included a 40-drill air com-
pressor and a 300 horse power steam hoist. On average the mine 
employed two hundred and fifty men, working at depths under-
ground of up to eight hundred and fifty feet.62 To oversee its 
complexities, the mine's new owners employed a Mining Engineer-
in-charge, William Carlyle. He had come to the job after serving as 
B.C.'s inaugural Provincial Mineralogist (appointed in 1895), in 
which capacity he wrote the first full-length report on Rossland. 
Earlier he had lectured in mining and metallurgy at McGill University 
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and worked in silver-lead mines in the western United States.63 The 
appointment of Carlyle to the LeRoi indicates the ways in which 
Rossland was maturing, the prospector's and developer's lucky 
strikes and gambles giving way to board-room decision-making 
based on the professional advice of engineers and other experts. 
But this was not the only transformation to affect Rossland during 
the period: as Figure 3 suggests, the ore itself was also changing.64 
That change, a drop in value per ton produced as the ore's mineral 
content declined, was to have a profound impact on the province's 
leading lode mining community. 
By the early 1900s the challenge confronting mine managers 
was to discover some way to treat the mines' increasingly low-grade 
copper gold ores at a profit. As the manager of the Centre Star mine 
told shareholders in his 1903 Annual Report, the mines had to find 
some way to adjust to "the transition from the occurrence of high 
grade bonanza ore bodies ... to masses of lower grade."65 It was 
becoming obvious that if some means was not soon found to 
process these latter ores, Rossland's future would be in jeopardy. 
Although the need to treat low grade ore had been discussed for 
some time, by 1903 the problem was receiving widespread atten-
tion.66 For example, at the end of the year Rossland's Gold Com-
missioner reported that 
some experiments ... have been conducted for the better reduction of 
Rossland's ores. ... In consequence of this, several plants, of varying 
nature, have been completed, or are under way, and the years to come 
will probably see a revolution in the treatment of ores of this camp, the 
initial stages of which have been witnessed in 1903.67 
Five concentrating mills were built in the vicinity of the mines in 
order to reduce smelter costs.68 If the ore underwent an initial stage 
of treatment at these mills, it would then be economical to ship the 
product, material of substantially higher grade, to the smelter. (For 
example, ore worth $8 a ton could not be mined and shipped to the 
smelter if the freight and treatment charges were $7.50; on the 
other hand, concentrates carrying values of $16 a ton might well 
return a profit to mine owners.) The most innovative of these 
experiments involved what was known as the "Elmore Oil Process." 
A fore-runner of the flotation process, it was installed at two Ross-
land mines (the LeRoi No. 2 and the White Bear) in 1903-1904, but 
ultimately proved to be a failure.69 The other mills around Rossland 
were no more successful than those using the Elmore process; these 
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failures suggested the need for other approaches to achieve "the 
chief end and object of mining, viz: - the earning of a profit."70 
In January 1905, the British Columbia Mining Record reflected on 
the past year's progress at Rossland, and regretfully acknowledged 
that "operations ... have not proved as satisfactory as was earlier 
anticipated."71 The failed attempts to concentrate Rossland's ore 
were central to the journal's account; it was clear that the mines 
had yet to be placed on a secure and profitable basis. The same 
month, a headline in a Vancouver newspaper proclaimed that 
"Rossland Depends on Concentration" "Its Future Now In The 
Balance."72 Like the former piece, this article concluded that the 
various efforts at concentration had not been notably successful. 
And it noted that a new solution to Rossland's difficulties was now 
being advanced: amalgamation of the various mines into one large 
concern. 
By the spring of 1905, local and national journals as well as the 
international mining press were discussing the efforts then under-
way to consolidate the leading Rossland properties.73 The key play-
ers met in Rossland to consider the mechanics of the proposed 
merger and made optimistic public statements: the War Eagle/Cen-
tre Star's new manager was hopeful; the LeRoi's managing director 
saw no obstacles ahead; George Waterlow, a LeRoi director, "stated 
with considerable emphasis that the proposed merger of the big 
mines and smelters of the Trail Creek district is practically an 
assured fact."74 Despite such optimism, the LeRoi did not end up as 
part of the new "consolidated" company that was formally created 
in January 1906. The critical event that cleared the way for this 
new company came on 1 June 1905, when the "Aldridge Syndi-
cate" (that is, the CPR) secured an option on the Gooderham-
Blackstock group's majority holdings in the War Eagle/Centre Star, 
the Rossland Power Company and the St. Eugene Consolidated. 
Despite Blackstock's reluctance, the purchase went through in late 
June, for $825,000.75 
Aldridge, the CPR's key player in the amalgamation proposal, 
tried hard to persuade those in charge of the LeRoi mine to join in 
the scheme. In late 1905 he travelled to London to attend a share-
holders' meeting considering the proposal, hoping to persuade 
them to support it. The LeRoi's English shareholders made their 
objections to amalgamation clear, however, so Aldridge returned to 
eastern Canada, where he orchestrated the formal creation of the 
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada [Com-
inco] from the heretofore separate properties controlled by the 
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CPR.76 In February 1906 Cominco issued its first report to share-
holders and Aldridge, its managing director, declared that 
The Consolidated Mining & Smelting Co. of Canada, Ltd., is not depen-
dent upon any single mine, nor upon any single mining district; but its 
interests and business, besides being to an extent industrial, will also be 
so diversified as to minimise, so far as possible, the speculative element.77 
Contemporary observers agreed with Aldridge, and saw Cominco's 
birth as reflecting a new maturity, a sign of the shift from an earlier 
form of mining venture - often marked by recklessness and stock 
market manipulation - to modern industrial organizations struc-
tured much like any other business.78 Although some years passed 
before Cominco became profitable, by 1941 virtually one-half of all 
dividends ever paid by B.C. mining companies (including coal) had 
gone to its shareholders. Twenty-five years later, a government 
publication credited the company with having produced "nearly 
one half the metal wealth of British Columbia."79 
* * * 
The period examined in these pages, from the early efforts to 
establish lode mining in the Cariboo during the 1870s and 1880s 
through to the trials and tribulations of Rossland's mines in the 
first years of this century, was a transitional one. It was clear by the 
late 1870s that the rich placer gold deposits were rapidly depleting 
yet the establishment of a modern precious and base metals indus-
try in British Columbia did not occur until the 1900s. Technology 
played a central role in this latter process, as innovations in milling 
and refining techniques - notably selective flotation and electro-
lytic refining - facilitated the bulk treatment necessary to treat low 
grade ores profitably.80 Companies such as Cominco devoted much 
time and money to metallurgical research, recognising the key role 
that applied science was assuming in the industry. 
Although technology was to become critical to the success of the 
mining industry, during the years examined here it was regarded in 
a much less sophisticated way, essentially as a "quick fix" solution 
to the twin problems of depletion and decline. From the calls for 
expert advice and government help in the Cariboo in the late 
1870s through to the experiments with new concentrating tech-
niques in Rossland in 1903 and 1904, people were concerned with 
little more than overcoming immediate economic difficulties. But 
technology can not be invoked in isolation; it comes as part of a 
larger package. The necessary capital expenditures lead to economies 
182 The Assistance of Science and Capital 
of scale and vertical integration, and the unity of conception and 
execution at the workplace is dissolved, replaced by the university-
trained engineer and a de-skilled group of workers. 
The changes which occurred in the hard rock mining industry 
went much further than simply the introduction of new machines 
or processes: they occurred as part of a larger transformation of the 
region. Mining, however, initiated this transformation. Mineral 
extraction created underground areas that required elaborate sys-
tems of timber supports to minimise the danger of cave-ins. 
Machinery was essential to ventilate and drain these subterranean 
spaces, as well as to operate the winding gear which gave under-
ground access. Once on the surface, the ore went to veritable 
factories where the mineral content was separated out by a variety 
of complex processes. Sophisticated transportation facilities were 
needed to ship the final product. All this led to nearly identical 
industrial conditions in the communities of the western Cordillera 
and by the 1900s their landscapes were dominated by the same 
features: shafts capped by headframes; the insistent noise and pol-
lution of surface workings with their machinery, their slag heaps 
and their smoke stacks; and everywhere work rhythms orchestrated 
by "boss whistle." These were among the most industrialized envi-
ronments of their day. 
Cole Harris has observed that "in this corner of the New 
World [the Interior of British Columbia] abstractions become 
realities, and the long story of emerging modernity, extending 
back through European millennia, is compressed into a hundred 
years or so."81 At Rossland, this compression is even more dra-
matic: from the first staking of the mines in 1890, scarcely fifty 
years passed before researchers in the nearby smelting and refin-
ing complex were conducting experiments with heavy water for 
the Manhattan project. 
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